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Abstract
Protecting the privacy of input data is of growing importance as machine learning
applications reach new application domains. Cloud companies are providing
machine learning as a service to make it easier for data holders to create customized
training and inference paradigms. In this paper, we provide a unified training
and inference framework for large DNNs while protecting input privacy. Our
approach called DarKnight relies on cooperative execution between GPUs and
trusted execution environment (TEE) to train complex models. The cooperative
execution allows DarKnight to exploit the computational power of GPUs to perform
linear operations, while exploiting TEEs to protect input privacy. In particular,
DarKnight uses a novel encoding to linearly combine multiple inputs along with
an additive stream cipher noise to obfuscate the inputs. The proposed encoding
process allows DarKnight to efficiently decode the computed data even as the
model parameters continuously evolve during the backward propagation of DNN
training. DarKnight further simplifies the encoding process for inference where the
model parameters are unchanged. Unlike prior approaches, DarKnight does not
need to store model parameters within the TEE memory thereby getting around
the TEE’s limited secure memory limitations. By encoding and decoding multiple
inputs during each iteration, DarKnight is well suited for current generation batch
training process. We implement DarKnight on an Intel SGX enclave augmented
with a GPU to demonstrate our new training capabilities.
1 Introduction
The need for protecting input privacy in machine learning (ML) is growing rapidly in many areas such
as health care [1], autonomous vehicles [2], business [3], communication [4] and etc. In this paper
we propose a novel methodology that offers data security to the data holders with privacy concerns.
One of most prominent benefits of this work is that MLaaS engineer can easily utilize this framework
to securely implement their desired DNNs in the cloud, without any model modifications. To achieve
this goal, this work rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) to provide a unified scheme
for inference and training of large DNNs on private data. The primary challenge of using TEEs is
that DNNs need powerful computational and memory resources while existing TEEs computational
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power and memory space is very limited. Prior training schemes [5, 6] secure the entire model within
a TEE, thereby preventing large models from taking advantage of the TEE and also are unable to
use ML accelerators such as GPUs. Prior inference schemes using TEE [7, 8, 9, 10] exploit the fact
that model parameters are fixed during inference to enable split execution between TEE and GPU.
These schemes cannot be used for training since the parameters are constantly updated during the
training process. Our approach, called DarKnight, is a unified platform designed for both training
and inference of DNNs without revealing the input data to the MLaaS platforms. To the best of
our knowledge this is the first work that uses a single enclave for training large DNNs and has a
comparable performance with the fast GPUs.
DarKnight uses TEEs to linearly combine multiple inputs and then use an additive stream cipher
noise to blind the input data before exposing it to the unguarded hardware. The scheme then uses
a GPU to perform linear operations such as convolution and dense layer matrix multiplication on
the coded input data for high performance. By restricting GPUs to perform only linear operations,
DarKnight guarantees that computations on each input data can be decoded. By limiting TEEs to
perform only data encoding and non-linear operations, DarKnight enables training large DNN models
that exceed the size of TEE memory limitations. We design and implement DarKnight on an Intel
SGX server equipped with GPU. We train VGG16, VGG19 and MobileNet as large DNN models, to
demonstrate the efficacy of DarKnight. Furthermore, we perform several system-level optimization
to reduce the memory utilization of the TEE.
The rest of the paper organizes as follow. In Section 2, we describe the problem setup and design
objective. Section 3 explains the methodology for inference and training in addition to the challenges
facing the proposed algorithm. The experimental results 4 are presented in section. In section 5 we
draw the conclusion.
2 Background
2.1 Intel SGX
Trusted execution environments such as ARMTrustZone[11], Intel SGX[12] and Sanctum[13] provide
an execution environment where computational integrity of user’s application is guaranteed by the
hardware. For instance, using Intel SGX provides a limited amount of secure memory within an
enclave which is protected from other processes, operating systems, hypervisors, and physical attacks.
Users can write code to execute part of their application within an enclave while allowing other parts
to be executed outside of an enclave. SGX has 128 MB as the enclave memory. In the case that the
enclave application needs more space, a time consuming page eviction process is initiated.
While some types of side channel attacks have been performed on SGX, Intel has been able to
fix many of these attacks [14, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 12]. In this work we assume that computations
performed within SGX are invisible to the outside entities. Instead DarKnight focuses on exploiting
this feature to securely and efficiently perform inference and training.
2.2 Related Work
There are a variety of approaches for protecting input privacy during DNN training and inference.
We categorized these approaches in Table 1. These approaches can be classified as those that rely
on homomorphic encryption (HE), multi-party computing (MPC), trusted execution environments
(TEE), differential privacy (DiffP), and additive noise (Noise). In some of the works mentioned
below a combination of forenamed techniques is used. Those works are assigned to a category that
describes them best. These techniques can be applied either for inference or training. Homomorphic
encryption techniques encrypt input data and then perform inference directly on encrypted data, albeit
with significant performance penalty [19, 20, 21, 22]. Secure multi-party computing is another
approach, where multiple non-colluding servers may use custom data exchange protocols to protect
input data [33, 24, 28, 29]. However, this approach requires multiple servers to perform training or
inference. An entirely orthogonal approach is to use differential privacy, which aims to guarantee
the confidentiality of the user, if the output of the DNN for that user is exposed [30, 31, 32]. Additive
Noise is another approach mostly used for inference. In this mechanism there is a trade-off between
the privacy performance, computational complexity and, model accuracy [25, 26, 27]. Our idea relies
on TEEs to perform private inference or training in a secure hardware [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In particular,
TEE-based training solutions focus on holding the entire model within the TEE environment which
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Table 1: Various Prior Works: Techniques Used and Their Applicability
HE MPC TEE DiffP Noise
Inference
FHME[19],
MiniONN [20],
CryptoNets[21],
Gazelle[22]
SGXCMP[23],
SecureML[24]
Mlcapsule[7],
ObliviousTEE[8],
P-TEE[9],
Slalom[10]
Arden [25],
NOffload[26],
Shredder [27]
Training
SecureML[24],
SecureNN [28],
ABY3 [29]
MSP[5],
Chiron [6]
DiffP[30],
Rappor [31],
Apple [32]
PP DNN[33]
protects data and model from outside attackers. However, TEEs impose severe memory and compute
limitations since the size of the model that fits within a TEE is quite small, thereby preventing large
models from taking advantage of the TEE. Furthermore, most of the DNN training methods are
currently performed on GPUs which do not support TEE.
In particular, Slalom [10] is an inference framework for protecting data privacy and integrity. Slalom
uses the Intel SGX enclave to secure received input data x from a client, and blind input data with
an additive stream cipher noise r. The blinded data (x + r) is then sent to an untrusted accelerator
where linear operations are performed. The computed data W · (x + r) is then returned to the
enclave which can decode the correct computational output W · x by subtracting the precomputed
W · r. Here W is the model parameter matrix. There are challenges towards the promise of Slalom.
First, Slalom cannot be used for training, since it precomputes W · r offline and performs simple
subtraction operation to decode the output W · x. Precomputing the blinding factors is not possible
during training since the model parameters W are updated after every batch. Computing W · r inside
the SGX after every batch also defeats the purpose of offloading the computations. Even in inference,
securely storing multiple instances of r’s and their corresponding W · r’s within the enclave memory,
occupies a substantial amount of memory for large DNNs. On the other hand, storing an encrypted
version of these values outside the enclave memory, leads to significant encryption and decryption
costs, as these values are needed after each linear operation.
3 DarKnight
DarKnight supports both inference and training in a single framework. Figure 1 depicts the overall
execution flow of DarKnight. A MLaaS cloud server has at least one SGX enclave and one GPU
accelerator. Our goal is to rely on the GPU to perform computationally intensive operations while
relying on SGX to protect input privacy. As such the initial model (W) that a user wants to train is
loaded into the cloud server. (1) The training image set is encrypted using a mutually agreed keys
with SGX. (2) SGX decrypt the image. (3) SGX calls DarKnight’s blinding mechanism to seal the
data. (4) The blinded data is offloaded GPU for linear operation. (5) GPU performs linear operations
and returns the data back to SGX. (6) SGX decodes the received computation using DarKnight’s
decoding strategy and performs activation to get the next layer’s hidden feature map. This process is
repeated both for forward and backward propagation for each layer. The only difference between
training and inference is the blinding and unblinding strategy. DarKnight designs a novel blinding
strategy that can blind the weight updates and hidden feature maps which are computed with respect
to a specific training input. While for inference the approach is simplified.
DarKnight enables training and inference on very large models as its unique blinding strategy does
not need to store the model parameters (W) within secure memory. Instead only a few scalars need
to be protected, thereby allowing efficient training of large DNN models with multiple images as we
explain below:
3.1 Privacy in Inference
In this section we start with DarKnight’s inference strategy. We consider a trained DNN, represented
by model parameters W with L layers, which is performing inference on input x0, which must be
protected. At a layer l the inference process computes yl = 〈Wl , xl〉, where 〈·, ·〉 corresponds to the
bilinear operation at that layer (e.g. matrix product, convolution, etc.). After the linear operation an
activation function (g(·)) creates the next layer input xl+1 = g(yl). Within this context, DarKnight
first receives a set of K inputs x(1)0 , . . . ,x
(K)
0 for a batch inference from a client. Our goal is to
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Figure 1: General Steps of One Forward Pass of DarKnight for Training a DNN
perform linear calculations of y(1)0 = 〈W0 · x(1)0 〉, . . . ,y(K)0 == 〈W0 · x(K)0 〉 on the GPU without
exposing the inputs to the GPU. Note that the subscript 0 in all these variables refers to the values of
the first layer. As of this point, we will drop the subscript for a more clear notation. The blinding and
unblinding strategy is similar for the rest of the layers.
Key Insight: The main idea behind DarKnight’s privacy protection scheme is the fact that our
multiplication operator is bilinear. Thus, instead of asking the GPU to calculate 〈W,x(i)〉, which
exposes the inputs, DarKnight blinds multiple inputs by combining them linearly plus a random noise
vector with sufficient power. Due to the bilinear property any linear operation on K blinded inputs
can be recovered if there are K different linear computations performed.
DarKnight Blinding: More specifically, DarKnight creates K + 1 inputs x¯(1), . . . , x¯(K), as follows,

x¯(1) = α1,1x
(1) + · · ·+ α1,Kx(K) + α1,(K+1)r
...
x¯(K+1) = α(K+1),1x
(1) + · · ·+ α(K+1),kx(K) + α(K+1),(K+1)r
. (1)
The scalars αi,j and the noise vector r are randomly generated, such that the variance of the noise
is sufficiently larger than the inputs (See remarks below for more details). We gather the scalars
αi,j’s in the the matrix A. And we assume that A is secured in enclave memory and is invisible to
an adversary. Hence, by revealing the values x¯(i)’s to the external hardware, we do not expose the
inputs x(i)’s.
The blinded data x¯(i)’s are sent to the GPU which performs the following computations: y¯(1) =
〈W, x¯(1)〉 ... y¯(K+1) = 〈W, x¯(K+1)〉.
DarKnight Unblinding: The k+ 1 outputs y¯(i) returned from the GPU must be deblinded to extract
the original results y(i). These value can be extracted as follows,
Y¯ =
〈
W · [x¯(1), . . . , x¯(K+1)]
〉
=
〈
W · [x(1), . . . ,x(K), r]
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y
·A ⇒ Y = Y¯ ·A−1 (2)
Few remarks are in place (1) Unlike prior works DarKnight does not need to store W · r within the
enclave memory thereby significantly enhancing our ability to infer with much larger models. (2) The
size of the matrix A that is secured is proportional to the number of inputs that are blinded together
rather than the model size W, which is several orders of magnitude larger. (3) The values of the
matrix A can be computed offline in the pre-processing phase for performance improvement. We also
prefer to choose a matrix A, with a condition number close to one, so that our blinding and unblinding
algorithm remains numerically stable. For this purpose, orthogonal matrices serves us the best. (4)
The process of deblinding K inputs with one additive stream cipher requires K + 1 computations.
During deblinding we extract W · r, but that value is just dropped. Thus DarKnight trades 1/K
additional computations in order to eliminate the need to secure very large model parameters.
Selection ofK: Selecting largerK (number of images that are batch inferred) decreases the overhead
of one additional noise related computation. However, increasing the size of K requires blinding
multiple images within an enclave. Our analysis indicates we can merge and process up to four
images from ImageNet dataset at the same time without exceeding current SGX memory limitations.
This result is shown in Figure 2a. Thus we need one extra linear computation for every four image
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inference requests.
The noise vector: Here, we proposed a simple version of the DarKnight that shares one noise vector
r, among all the equations. This is sufficient to blind the inputs in each equations. But a more
complicated version of the DarKnight is explained in the Appendix, that uses multiple noises in each
equation in a way to decrease the mutual information between the equations (1) (in case the attacker
knows the underlying blinding method).
3.2 Privacy in Training
Model training places a significant burden on DarKnight’s input obfuscation scheme used for infer-
ence. In the training setting, the model parameters, W, are updated each time a batch is processed.
For a model with L layers which is being trained with a batch of K inputs, the model parameters Wl
at layer l are updated using the well known SGD process as:
Wnewl = W
old
l − η × OWl, OWl =
1
K
K∑
i=1
〈δ(i)l ,x(i)l 〉 (3)
Here η is the learning rate, and δ(i)l is the gradient of the loss for the i
th point in the training batch,
with respect to the output of layer l. DarKnight must protect x(i)l for each layer of the DNN when
the layer’s linear operations (convolution, matrix multiplication) are outsourced to a GPU. Recall
that the decoding process for inference exploited the invariant property of model parameter for any
given input such that
〈
W · [x¯(1), . . . , x¯(k+1)]〉 = 〈W · [x(1), . . . ,x(k), r]〉 ·A . However, during
the training process, , we a have different δ(i)l for each input x
(i)
l . Thus, decoding the 〈δ(i)l ,x(i)l 〉
from obfuscated inputs 〈δ(i)l , x¯(i)l 〉 is a non-trivial challenge.
Key Insight: The key insight is that while training a batch of inputs it is not necessary to compute
the 〈δ(i)l ,x(i)l 〉 for each input x(i). Instead the training process only needs to compute cumulative
parameter updates for the entire batch of inputs. Hence, what is necessary to compute is the entire
OWl which is a summation over multiple inputs in the batch.
DarKnight Blinding: DarKnight exploits this insight to protect privacy without significantly
increasing the encoding and decoding complexity of the blinding process. In particular DarKnight
uses a new linear encoding scheme to combine inputs (covered by noise). As shown in (3), there are
K inputs on which gradients are computed. Instead of calculating the K products in (3), DarKnight
calculate the following K + 1 equations, in the backward propagation,
OWl =
K+1∑
j=1
γj Eqj , Eqj =
〈
K∑
i=1
αj,i δ
(i)
l ,
K∑
i=1
βj,i x
(i)
l + βj,(K+1) r¯
〉
(4)
DarKnight selects αj,i’s, βj,i’s and γi’s such that
Aᵀ · Γ ·B =

1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 . . . 0 1 0

K×(K+1)
(5)
Assuming batch size is equal to K, the αi,j parameters used for scaling δ values is gathered in the
K + 1 by K matrix, A. βi,j’s are gathered in the K + 1 by K + 1 matrix B, the scalar matrix with
the same size for intermediate features and γi’s form the diagonal of a K + 1 by K + 1 matrix Γ,
that gives us the proper parameters for efficient decoding.
DarKnight Unblinding: Given the constraint imposed on αj,i’s, βj,i’s and γi’s the decoding
process is trivially simple to extract OW. It is easy to see that if the scalars αi,j’s, βi,j’s and γi’s
satisfy the relation (5), we will have
1
K
K+1∑
j=1
γj Eqj =
1
K
K∑
i=1
〈δ(i)l ,x(i)l 〉 = OWl (6)
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In other words, the unblinding process only involves calculating a linear combination of the equations
in (4), which are calculated in the untrusted GPU and there is no need to compute each component
individually. DarKnight Training Complexity: It is important to note that DarKnight’s training
approach for blinding and unblinding is very simple. All the scaling parameters can be generated
in the prepossessing phase and can be stored inside TEE. The size of the α, δ and γ matrices is just
proportional to the square of the batch size that is being processed at one time. Even with a 8-64
batch size (commonly used in VGG training [34, 35]) these scaling values are substantially smaller
than the model parameters W. Furthermore, even with a batch size of 8-64 the TEE may choose to
process only a small subset of images, called a virtual batch, at a time. The size of the virtual batch is
limited by the size of the SGX memory that must compute the x¯(i), typically 4-8 images at a time.
Thus the scaling parameters for blinding are quite small.
3.3 Extending DarKnight to Verify Data Integrity with Untrusted GPU
Apart from protecting privacy DarKnight can be extended easily to a scenario where the GPU
hardware is not trusted. In this case the linear computations performed by the GPU must also be
verified. In the interest of space we just provide an insight into how DarKnight can perform data
integrity checks for inference. Similar extensions for training are also possible. Recall that DarKnight
creates K + 1 blinded inputs x¯(1), . . . , x¯(K+1) for K original inputs. To provide integrity DarKnight
creates one additional linear combination of inputs x¯(K+2) using the same approach as in Eq.1. This
additional computation allows every output y(i) to be extracted by the SGX enclave by solving
two different sets of linear equations. With this redundant equation, we can detect an error when
the two ways to extract each y(i) does not match. In case an error is detected, the enclave may
perform additional corrective action, such as executing on another GPU worker or perform additional
redundant computations. But these actions are outside the scope of our current work.
3.4 Random Noise and Quantization
The strength of random noise r added by DarKnight provides strong privacy guarantees for both
training and inference. However, strong noise may also obfuscate the original signal due to floating
point errors, particularly with long running training iterations where the errors may accumulate. On
one hand using a powerful random noise gives a more robust privacy guarantee and on the other hand,
a strong noise requires a stricter quantization mechanism and consequently may affect the accuracy of
training and inference. Quantized DNNs have been widely studied in recent years [36, 37, 38, 39, 40].
In this work we assume that either appropriate quantization is already performed or the random noise
r does not significantly accumulate the training errors. In the next section, we run some numerical
experiments to evaluate the effect of additive noise to accuracy of inference and training.
4 Experiments
4.1 Setup
All the experiments ran on Intel(R) Coffee Lake E-2174G 3.80GHz processor. This server has 64 GB
RAM and supports Intel Soft Guard Extension (SGX). The co-located GPU that is used for linear
operations is Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti. In all of the following simulations, a single thread is
performing the TEE’s functionality. Adding multiple threads has its complications especially because
of the memory requirement for thread creation.
We used three different DNN models: VGG16 [41], VGG19 [41] and, MobileNet [42]. MobileNet’s
goal is to design a small DNN which can be used on small devices and phones. Therefore, it replaces
standard convolution with depth-wise convolution followed by point-wise convolution to reduce the
number of linear operations. We used three well-known datasets for inference and training. one
is CIFAR-10 [43] that has 50000 training images evenly distributed between 10 categories. Each
32x32 image stores three bytes of RGB for each pixel. CIFAR-100 [43] has 100 classes and each
class contains 600 images. The other dataset is ImageNet [44] which is an image dataset designed
based on WorldNet hierarchy with more than 1.2 million images and 1000 categories.
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4.2 Results
For the sake of comparison we implement two baselines: one fully implemented on GPU and the
other one is fully on SGX. For inference, we also compare our performance with Slalom [10] which is
a privacy scheme that can only be used for inference. Needless to mention, the GPU version does not
provide any security guarantee. For inference, we show how our model speeds up the execution time
in both VGG16, VGG19 and MobileNet. Moreover, we examined the effect of different noise signals
on the accuracy of inference. For training, first the effect of noise on the accuracy and convergence
is analysed. Furthermore, The details of timing comparison of each operation is depicted for both
forward and backward pass. Our source codes, GPU comparisons, and more results for more models
and datasets are available at our github:
4.2.1 Inference
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Figure 2: Inference execution time and speedup for ImageNet dataset of batch size 64 with Different
models and configurations
Effect of Virtual Batch Size: Figure 2a demonstrates the effect of merging multiple images on
the speedup of inference. As we explained in 2.1, the memory capacity of SGX is very limited
and processing more data than the capacity of SGX cause performance degradation because of the
complicated encryption and eviction procedure. DarKnight(k) denote a case of having a virtual batch
size of k meaning that k input images combined and blinded with a noise signal. The X-axis shows
the SGX operations and the Y-axis represents the speedup relative to the baseline of DarKnight(1)
for each operation. As shown, combining more images up to a certain point, yields a speed up in all
the operations. But by merging more than a certain number of images, the performance degrades
significantly. The reason behind this observation is that after adding 4 images the available enclave
memory is saturated. In the rest of the inference section we use DarKnight(4) which shows the most
promising performance.
Inference Speedup: Figure 2b compares the speedup of the inference process for VGG16, VGG19
and MobileNet. The case of performing all the calculations on the SGX, using Slalom for inference,
using Slalom with integrity, using DarKnight(4), and using DarKnight(3)+Integrity. A few remarks
are in place. As observed in the figure, integrity increases the execution time, since we add some
redundancy to the calculations to guarantee the integrity. We also observe 15-fold speedup, compared
to the fully on SGX baseline, and 30% improvement compared to Slalom for VGG16. This advantage
originates from two points. First, Slalom stores many random vectors, ri’s, and their corresponding
Wl · ri. Therefore, it has less memory available for processing images and cannot simultaneously
process the same amount of images as our model. To avoid storing the Wl · ri’s inside the SGX,
they store the encrypted version of them in the unprotected memory. In each iteration, and in each
layer, SGX has to go through the decryption procedure which has a substantial performance overhead.
Moreover, they did not fully utilize the SGX memory, as they have to sequentially process one image
at a time. For integrity checks Slalom uses Freivalds’ algorithm. However, their implementation
only checks the integrity of convolution layers and dense layers integrity check are disregarded for
simplicity. On the other hand, our implementation the integrity of all the linear operations including
dense layers are checked. For integrity checks in our design we used the DarKnight(3) model in
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which three images are linearly combined and covered by noise. The reason is that when integrity
checks are added to the design, one extra equation is generated. In the other words, we will have 5
equations and 4 unknowns. We will have to simply make sure that the result derived from the first four
are consistent with the fifth equation. In order to avoid memory overflow of SGX, it is beneficial to
reduce the number of images from four to three, hence we use DarKnight(3) model. As depicted, our
implementation of VGG16 with integrity has 45% performance improvement, compared to Slalom,
while offering more robustness by checking the integrity of all linear layers.
The same is scheme is used for analyzing MobileNet behaviour. As mentioned in section 4.1,
MobileNet reduced the amount of convolution computation and that is why we expect it to show
less performance improvement using our method in relative to baseline. Although its speedup over
baseline on SGX is less than VGG16, we still observe a 7.7x speedup, compared to SGX model, and
13% speedup over Slalom.
Effect of Noise on Accuracy: For our simulations, we use a random Gaussian vector with iid
Table 2: Effect of Different Noise Signals on the Accuracy of DarKnight Inference for VGG16,
VGG19 and MobileNet on ImageNet with Batch-size = 64
VGG16 VGG19 MobileNet
Noise Top1 Accuracy Top5 Accuracy Top1 Accuracy Top5 Accuracy Top1 Accuracy Top5 Accuracy
Clean 63.36 84.14 63.35 84.59 64.17 84.44
N (4e3, 4e3) 63.42 84.14 64.14 84.42 64.21 84.64
N (2e4, 4e3) 63.37 84.23 64.10 84.49 64.10 84.49
N (1e4, 1e4) 63.37 83.88 64.21 84.47 64.15 84.18
N (1e4, 5e3) 63.49 84.00 64.33 84.71 64.08 84.42
entries, N (µ, σ2), as the noise vectors ri’s. In Table 2, we investigated the effect of various means
and variances for the noise, on the accuracy of the inference of VGG16, VGG19 and MobileNet. It is
worth mentioning that the accuracy of the baseline (first row of the table) could be improved with
different mechanisms, which is out of the scope of this work. While for a few of the noise signals a
negligible accuracy loss are observed, for most of them, adding a noise signals cause no accuracy
degradation. This arguments holds for VGG19 and MobileNet and also CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
The noise signals we applied here are orders of magnitude larger than dataset.
4.2.2 Training
We used Intel Deep Neural Network Library (DNNL) for designing the DNN layers including the
Convolution layer, ReLU, MaxPooling and, Dense layer. For evaluating training performance, two
aspects are examined. One is the accuracy of training considering adding noise to the data and the
other one is the execution time of training.
Effect of Noise on Accuracy: As depicted in Figure 3, the accuracy of training for different noise
is measured during the first 200 epochs on VGG16 and VGG19. Figure 3a shows the accuracy of
training for VGG16 on CIFAR-10 dataset. As demonstrated the accuracy after epoch 150 with some
of noise signals is less than 0.001 and for some no accuracy degradation is observed. The same
argument holds for CIFAR-100 as depicted in 3b. The same argument holds for VGG19.
Training Execution Time: Figure 4 demonstrates the speed of training using DarKnight relative
Number of Epochs
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
50 100 150 200
Clear Data N(5e4, 5e3) N(1e4, 1e4) N(4e4, 1e4)
(a) Training Accuracy of
CIFAR-10 on VGG16 for
the First 200 Epochs and
Batch size=32
Number of Epochs
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
50 100 150 200
Clean N(5e4, 5e3) N(1e4, 1e4) N(4e4, 1e4)
(b) Training Accuracy of
CIFAR-100 on VGG16
for the First 200 Epochs;
Batch size=128
Number of Epochs
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
50 100 150 200
Clean N(5e4, 5e3) N(4e4, 1e4) N(4e4, 4e4)
(c) Training Accuracy of
CIFAR-10 on VGG19 for
the First 200 Epochs and
Batch size=128
Number of Epochs
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
50 100 150 200
Clean N(1e4, 1e4) N(4e4, 1e4) N(4e4, 2e4)
(d) Training Accuracy of
CIFAR-100 on VGG19
for the First 200 Epochs;
Batch size=128
Figure 3: Training Accuracy of DarKnight in Different DNNs and Datasets
to the baseline fully implemented on SGX for both forward pass and backward propagation. It
breaks down the execution time spent in each category and shows the speedup we get per category
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of operations per image. For VGG16 for example, as shown for the baseline linear operation takes
0.85 and 0.99 of the execution time in forward and backward pass respectively. In forward pass the
summation of blinding/unblinding and the linear operations reduces the linear operation time on SGX
by 72% and hence the total execution time is cut by 70%. For backward propagation, this reduction is
even higher since the total blinding/unblinding plus linear operation in DarKnight takes only 10% of
the time that baseline spent for its linear computation. As a result, DarKnight speeds up the backward
propagation by more than 7 times. It is worth mentioning that, our implementation of ReLU takes
longer than the baseline because some part of the unblinding function is fused to ReLU function for
performance purposes. For VGG19 the same behaviour is observed.
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Figure 4: Training Speedup of VGG16 and VGG19 on ImageNet
5 Conclusion
MLaaS has been attracted many data holders’ attention recently. One of the most important concerns
of data owners is data privacy and computation integrity. In this work, we address these issues using
Trusted Execution Environments(TEEs). This work utilizes TEEs to establish a solid baseline for
both training and inference by minimizing the information leakage and increasing the robustness of
the computation. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that uses TEEs for training large
DNNs while having a comparable performance with fast insecure hardware. We achieve a significant
speedup by offloading the computationally expensive operations to the co-located GPU while keeping
the non-linear operation inside the trusted hardware. For training, we preserve the privacy of the
training points in standard SGD by linearly combining the training points and taking advantage of
additive stream cipher noise. For training and inference, a novel encoding and decoding procedure
is designed to reduce the overhead of blinding and unblinding functions which prepare the data for
exposing it to the unguarded hardware.
Broader Impact
These days Machine learning has more applications than anytime before. The need for data privacy
has been emerged especially now that smart homes, autonomous cars and, personal assistants have
been taking over the world. These applications need to process stream of data flowing to them on real
time. Since users do not want to reveal data about their personal lives, this real time data processing
needs to preserve privacy.
The idea of input privacy using TEEs can be used by all the companies who offer MLaaS and all their
costumers. This means that data holders can expose their private data to the secure part of the cloud
without any privacy concerns. The cloud itself takes the responsibility of protecting the data when
it needs to do a computationally expensive operations. Therefore, from data holder’s perspective
they do not need any extra computation or communication power. On the other hand from MLaaS
providers’ perspective, they do not need to design a different different cryptography method each
time their costumers have a specific security requirement. The design time basically offloads to the
TEE designer and once they finish the design, tons of applications can take advantage of it. This is
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the first approach combining hardware and software to provide security and like every other area
having hardware designed for a specific task can improve the performance significantly. Furthermore,
MLaaS providers do not need to redesign the models or change any of the parameters for providing
security.
One disadvantage is that if MLaaS uses a specific TEE to preserve privacy, there will be attacks
targeted the TEE. Since the data is clean for the computations inside SGX, if an attacker is able to
invade the TEE they have full access over raw data. Also they can modify the training data in a way
that leads to noisy training.
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